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In December 2008, Siemens AG, the multinational German corporation with
over 400,000 employees and annual revenues in excess of €70 billion, entered a
guilty plea to violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The company
agreed to pay a $450 million criminal fine and disgorged profits of $350 million in
a related SEC civil enforcement action. This was by far the largest FCPA fine ever
paid, and marked a significant turning point in international business corruption
enforcement.1 Just two months later, in February 2009, UBS AG, Switzerland's
largest bank, entered in to a deferred prosecution agreement with the Department
of Justice that included a payment of $780 million in fines, penalties, and interest
for aiding United States citizens to avoid paying taxes on undeclared accounts at
the bank. More importantly, the Swiss bank agreed to turn over information about
its American clients to the IRS, apparently the first time in history the wall of
secrecy surrounding Swiss banking operations had been breached on a significant
scale.2
Each company undertook an extensive internal investigation to ascertain wrong-
doing by corporate employees and agreed to restructure its operations to ensure
future compliance with United States law. If the potential for criminal charges
being filed against the companies had not been available, would either corporation
have done anything to rectify the misconduct that occurred within the organiza-
tion? While one can bemoan corporate criminal liability as a "weed" growing in
the legal system,3 it cannot be denied that the potential for criminal prosecution of
an organization apart from its individual agents can serve important law enforce-
ment purposes.
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. © 2009, Peter J. Henning.
1. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/ pr/2008/December/08-crn-1105.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2009) (noting
that this level of coordination among enforcement authorities set the standard for multi-national cooperation in
fighting corruption).
2. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, UBS Enters into Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Feb. 18, 2009),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-tax-136.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2009) (noting that
the agreement is a milestone for law enforcement efforts that pulled aside the "veil of secrecy" to allow continued
pursuit of tax evaders).
3. See Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study of the Model Penal Code Position on
Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. Prrr. L. REv. 21, 21 (1957) (describing corporate criminal liability as a
"weed" and asserting that "[n]obody bred it, nobody cultivated it, nobody planted it. It just grew.").
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Yet the notion of corporate criminal liability continues to be questioned as an
unwarranted extension of the criminal law that gives prosecutors too much
authority over companies that feel compelled to cooperate. Recently, Andrew
Weissmann proposed narrowing the scope of corporate criminal liability by
requiring that the "government should bear the burden of establishing as an
additional criminal element that the corporation failed to have reasonable policies
and procedures to prevent the employee's conduct."4 Professor Ellen Podgor went
a step further in proposing a "good faith" affirmative defense if the company made
efforts to achieve compliance with the law.'
Some have even asserted that the criminal sanction should be reserved solely to
individuals rather than incorporeal organizations that cannot form criminal intent
or act on its own, leaving the regulation of businesses to civil enforcement
programs. For example, Professor Parker asserts that "there is no legitimate
function of corporate criminal liability that cannot be served equally as well, if not
better, by civil enforcement.",6 Mr. Lynch of the Cato Institute stated, "[p]olicymak-
ers should excise the doctrine of corporate criminal liability from American law.",7
Professor Baker argues, "[m]odern corporations are abstract, impersonal, utilitar-
ian entities lacking emotions and a personal story, and as such they do not deserve
sympathy simply because they are not human. For that reason alone, they should
not be the subjects of criminal prosecutions."8
So much has been made about prosecutorial unfairness in treating corporations,
that some multibillion dollar enterprises have been bullied by the Department of
Justice to cooperate with the government by acknowledging guilt and then turning
over records and employee statements regardless of guilt or innocence. And for
what crimes? According to former Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, Congress
has adopted "artificial crimes" that criminalize acts which cause no cognizable
harm to people or property.' 9
The demise of Arthur Andersen after its conviction in 2002 for obstruction of
justice is often used to "prove" the purported overwhelming power of prosecutors
and the trembling fear of corporations who dare not risk going to trial under any
circumstances lest they face near-certain destruction. 10 However, there have been
4. Andrew Weissmann, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liabiliiy, 82 IND. L.J. 411,411 (2007).
5. Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate World Mandates a "Good Faith" Affirmative Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 1537, 1538 (2007).
6. Jeffrey S. Parker, Doctrine for Destruction: The Case of Corporate Criminal Liability, 17 MANAGERIAL &
DECiSIOo EcON. 381,393 (1996).
7. Timothy Lynch, Introduction: First Principles of American Justice, in IN Tim NAME.OF JUSTICM, at xvii
(Timothy Lynch ed., Cato Institute 2009).
8. John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal Prosecution, 89 CORNELL L. REv.
310, 350 (2003).
9. Dick Thomburgh, The Dangers of Over-Criminalization and the Need for Real Reform: The Dilemma of
Artificial Entities andArtificial Crimes, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1279, 1280 (2007).
10. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005). The Supreme Court overturned the
conviction because of flawed jury instructions, and the Department of Justice decided not to seek a retrial. For a
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no other instances of a large firm suffering the same fate since then, even though
other companies that have been charged with crimes and appear to have survived
the ordeal, albeit quite a bit worse for wear.'" Moreover, despite the oft-repeated
statement that a corporation would never dare go to trial for fear of the conse-
quences, W.R. Grace & Co. did just that in fighting environmental charges and was
found not guilty along with three of its executives. 12 Somehow, citing to a single
example of a firm's demise after a conviction and simply asserting that corpora-
tions "never" go to trial seems to be sufficient to establish the problematic nature
of corporate criminal liability and its companion claim of prosecutorial overreach-
ing. But this is hollow. Despite the repeated criticisms of corporate criminal
liability, it is a staple of the criminal law in the United States, and unlikely to leave
the scene any time soon. Indeed, it is growing outside the United States as a means
of policing corporate misconduct.13
In this Essay, I focus on two questions that seem relevant to the current
discussion about the scope of corporate criminal liability: first, is there a justifica-
tion for applying the criminal law to a corporation or other type of business
organization? While there is at least the possibility of deterring an individual from
undertaking criminal conduct again by imposing punishment on the person, and
society can exact retribution from the law-breaker to vindicate its, interests and
discussion of Arthur Andersen's culture that may have contributed to the firm's choices regarding the destruction
of the Enron audit documents that led to the obstruction of justice charges, see Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Arthur Andersen
and the Temple of Doom, 37 Sw. U. L. REv. 97, 98 (2008).
11. The law firm Milberg, Weiss, Bershad & Schulman was charged with RICO and other violations in May
2006 related to improper payments to class action representatives and expert witnesses. The firm survived the
indictment, and ultimately entered into a "Case Disposition Agreement" that required it to pay a $75 million fine.
* After resolving the criminal prosecution, the firm reconstituted itself as Milberg LLP and remains a viable entity,
although it is not the litigation powerhouse it once was. See Lisa L. Casey, Class Action Criminality, 34 J. CORP.
L. 153, 235 (2008). Casey explains,
While the indictment did not cause Milberg Weiss to collapse, as some pundits had predicted, the
firm did have to shutter some offices, including its Florida branch that had employed 120 lawyers
in 2005.... Under its nonprosecution agreement with the government, Milberg LLP has five years
to satisfy the $75 million penalty assessed. However, even if the firm recovers some of the penalty
amounts from its four former partners who pleaded guilty to wrongdoing, the firm's survival still
depends upon its ability to attract clients and litigate cases successfully despite the reputational
harm caused by the indictment.
Id. In 2009, the W.R. Grace & Co. went on trial on environmental charges related to a vermiculite mine it operated
in Libby, Montana from 1963 to 1990. Kirk Johnson, Chemical Company is Acquitted in Asbestos Case, N.Y.
TtiEs, May 9, 2009, atA10. The company remains in business. "
12. W.R. Grace & Co. went on trial in 2009 on environmental charges related to a vermiculite mine it operated
in Libby, Montana from 1963 to 1990. Johnson, supra note 11, at A10. The company remained in business
throughout the period from its indictment in 2005 through the jury's verdict.
13. See Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1481,
1503 (2009) ("[Iln other countries, the focus in the past several decades has been on the creation of corporate
criminal liability in jurisdictions in which it did not exist, and where such liability already existed the modem
reforms included modifications intended to make it easier, rather than harder, to prosecute corporations criminally.
In particular, there have been notable changes in both English and Canadian law in the last decade aimed at
making it easier to prosecute corporations for homicide and for workplace injuries.").
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those of the victim, these rationales for punishment do not work well for
organizations that do not act through the same individuals and will continue to
exist even if individual miscreants are removed. My position is that designating
conduct as criminal is important apart from any sanction imposed and that the
application of the criminal law to an actor in society is a means to express a moral
judgment about that actor's conduct. Corporations are as much a part of modem
society as individuals, and so this expressive function of the criminal law is
particularly worthwhile when applied to organizations that play such a significant
role in the economy and indeed throughout society.
Second, if specific deterrence' 4 and retribution are, at best, weak justifications
for punishing corporations, is there a workable rationale for using criminal laws
rather than civil regulatory actions against organizations? I argue in this Essay that
the current trend toward using deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and
non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) to resolve criminal investigations of corpora-
tions highlight the proper focus on rehabilitation of the organization as the proper
goal of the application of the criminal law to corporations. Not every transgression
by a corporate agent can - or should - result in the prosecution of the organization,
and, in fact, the number of criminal prosecutions involving corporations - which
does not include cases resolved short of indictment by a DPA or NPA - is quite
small, fewer than 200 per year at the federal level. 15 When the focus is on
publicly-traded corporations and not closely-held businesses in which an owner or
senior manager is also charged, that number shrinks dramatically.
If criminal law can be legitimately applied to corporations, then DPAs and NPAs
are a worthwhile means to resolve investigations short of a full-blown indictment
and guilty plea by the organization because the goal of these agreements is to take
steps to prevent future violations. Rehabilitation focuses on the future, through
which a defendant resumes being a law-abiding member of society. In a complex
organization, it is a worthwhile use of the criminal law to create a means to ensure
compliance with the requirements of a DPA or NPA while retaining the threat of a
future, and perhaps highly destructive, criminal prosecution if a corporation
persists in wrongdoing.
14. I distinguish specific deterrence, which is focused on the particular defendant, from general deterrence,
under which a criminal punishment can discourage others from committing future crimes. General deterrence has
some measure of utility in corporate criminal liability because businesses do pay attention to what is happening in
their industry and even in the wider commercial community, so the impact of a criminal conviction may have an
effect on the organization. See Weissmann, supra note 4, at 428 ("General deterrence is particularly apt with
respect to corporate criminal conduct, which tends to be the antithesis of crimes of passion. Corporations -
through boards, inside and outside counsel, and formal deliberative processes - generally pay particular attention
to precedent in determining the risks and rewards of contemplated action."). Of course, it is not clear how much
impact a criminal sanction imposed on one company affects the conduct of others because the individuals in an
organization may assign different weights to the conviction of another company, and whether they view
themselves as similarly situated.
15. See U.S. SENTr'o COMM'N, SOURCE-OOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCO STATISTICS 2008, tbl. 51, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/Table51.pdf.
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I. APPLYING THE CRIMINAL LAW TO ORGANIZATIONS
The concept of corporate criminal liability has been assailed on a number of
fronts. The common law of crimes developed around the concept that an individual
can only be punished if there is a concurrence of a guilty mind - the mens rea
element - coupled with culpable acts. 16 Because a corporation has no mind, and
only acts through its agents, it has been posited that applying the criminal law to it
was an unwarranted - or at least unreflective - extension beyond what society
should otherwise permit. Professor Mueller noted that while the law of corporate
criminal liability is easily understood, "[i]t is safe to say that, for the most part, the
law has proceeded without rationale whatsoever. .17
The presumption of critics of corporate criminal liability seems to be that those
who are capable of being prosecuted for traditional common law offenses that
required proof of a criminal intent, like murder, rape, or larceny, are the only ones
properly within the purview of the criminal law. A late arrival to the social scene,
the corporation and its more recent descendants, like the limited liability company,
do not fit comfortably within the traditional requirements for liability for a crime
except through purportedly unacceptable legal fictions like "collective knowl-
edge" or vicarious liability. Thus, so the critique goes, corporate criminal liability
is an interloper in the criminal law.
A. Mens Rea is not Always Required
In conjunction with the critique of corporate criminal liability as falling well
outside the requirements of the criminal law is the supposition that its recognition
by the Supreme Court represented a radical - and unwarranted - break with the
past. In New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States,18 the
Supreme Court adopted the respondeat superior theory of corporate criminal
liability that allowed the criminal prosecution of an organization "by imputing [the
agent's] act to his employer and imposing penalties upon the corporation for which
he is acting in the premises."1 9 The Court relied on the tort theory of principal
liability for an agent's misdeeds, stating that it was only going "a step further" in
applying the theory of civil liability to a criminal case.
The notion of vicarious liability for individuals based on the conduct of another
is not unknown in the criminal law. As Professor Beale pointed out, "The
persistence of the felony murder rule and certain rules of accomplice liability (such
as the natural and probable consequences doctrine) demonstrates that many
16. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SuBsTANTIrvE CRIMINAL LAW § 5. 1(a), at 239 (2d ed. 2003) ("The basic premise
that for criminal liability some mens rea is required is expressed by the Latin maxim actus non facit reum nisi
mens sit rea (an act does not make one guilty unless his mind is guilty).").
17. Mueller, supra note 3, at 23.
18. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
19. Id. at 494.
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jurisdictions continue to impose very serious sanctions without a finding of fault
based upon mens rea.",20 Similarly, under the Pinkerton doctrine, a coconspirator is
liable for the crimes of another conspirator that were committed during the course
of the conspiracy, and were reasonably foreseeable acts in furtherance of it.21 The
respondeat superior theory for corporate criminal liability is not such a great leap
because assessing the organization's particular mens rea is difficult and using the
criminal law to proscribe certain forms of conduct is more easily accommodated
by vicarious liability in much the same way it is done in other areas of the criminal
law.
New York Central should not be viewed as an isolated decision or somehow
aberrational in the development of federal criminal law. Three years before the
Court upheld corporate criminal liability, it held in Hale v. Henkel that corpora-
tions cannot assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
because the right is available only to natural persons and not organizations, while
finding at the same time that a corporation was protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment's protection against unreasonable searches.22 Both New York Central and
Hale involved two of the leading pieces of federal economic regulation in this era,
the Sherman Act23 and the Elkins Act.24 Each law reached not only individuals but
also corporations, and reflected the desire to exert some measure of federal control
over large business combinations through the application of the criminal law.
The rejection of the railroad's claim in New York Central that due process should
prevent it from being convicted of a crime because it could not form the requisite
20. Sara Sun Beale, Solutions: Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique?, 44 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1503, 1514
(2007). Professor Beale notes that "[c]ompared to liability for homicide, corporate criminal liability for white
collar offenses does not seem like such a big deal." Id. at 1515.
21. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646 (1946) ("And so long as the partnership in crime continues,
the partners act for each other in carrying it forward). The Supreme Court went on to explain:
A different case would arise if the substantive offense'committed by one of the conspirators was
not in fact done in furtherance of the conspiracy, did not fall within the scope of the unlawful
project, or was merely a part of the ramifications of the plan which could not be reasonably
foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.
Id. at 647-48. A number of states have rejected Pinkerton liability for coconspirators who do not directly engage in
the criminal acts. See, e.g., Bolden v. State, 124 P.3d 191, 200 (Nev. 2005), overruled on other grounds by
Cortinas v. State, 195 P.3d 315 (Nev. 2009); State v. Stein, 27 P.3d 184, 185 (Wash. 2001); State ex rel. Woods v.
Cohen, 844 P.2d 1147, 1151 (Ariz. 1993); State v. Lind, 322 N.W.2d 826, 841-42 (N.D. 1982); State v. Nevarez,
130 P.3d 1154, 1159 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006).
22. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75, 76 (1906) overruled in part on other grounds by Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 (1906).
23. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Star. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006)).
24. The first federal statute extensively regulating shipping was the Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat.
379 (1887). It was later amended by the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Star. 847 (1903), and the Hepburn Act, ch. 3591,
34 Stat. 584 (1906). The original Interstate Commerce Act did not have criminal provisions; these were added in
the later acts. E.g., Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847, 847 (1903) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1964)
(repealed 1978)) (soliciting, accepting or receiving a "rebate, concession, or discrimination" at less than a
published rate constitutes a misdemeanor).
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mens rea for an offense was hardly surprising given the emphasis at the time on
reining in large-scale businesses that were changing the economic landscape so
significantly. The Court's conclusory explanation for using the tort theory of
liability to determine the criminal liability of a corporation does not somehow
signal that it was acting outside the usual realm of the criminal law, nor that its
holding was unsupportable. The federal law was developing stronger tools to
regulate organizations that had achieved such pervasive influence over the economy
by enhancing economic regulation at the national level. The Court's holding that
Congress could enact a statute which subjects a corporation to criminal prosecu-
tion was not a radical change or even an improper extension of federal authority
over businesses when viewed in that context.
It has been argued by Professors Fischel and Sykes that "New York Central
seemed to signal a complete repudiation of the common-law rule that corporations
could not commit crimes. 25 This common law rule is traceable to two statements:
one by the Lord High Justice in 1701 in an otherwise unknown decision that a
"corporation is not indictable but the particular members of it are,' 26 and the other
by Lord Blackstone in his Commentaries published in the 1760s that "a corpora-
tion cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime, in it's [sic] corporate
capacity.... 27 Of course, the common law did not adopt fixed rules like modem
statutes, but instead reflected the development of the law by the judiciary in
response to new - and changing - circumstances in which prior caselaw provide
important, but not suffocating,. guidance.28 Federal criminal law, which was at
issue in New York Central, is purportedly a creature solely of statute because - in
29the oft-repeated mantra - there is no federal common law of crimes. While one
25. Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LFA. STuD. 319, 335 (1996).
26. Anonymous Case (No. 935), 88 Eng. Rep. 1518, 1518 (K.B. 1701) (Holt, C.J.).
27. 1 WnIIAM BLAcKsTONp, CotmirrARis *476 (Birch 1803).
28. Professors Fischel and Sykes note that "by the mid-nineteenth century, cracks began appearing in the
common-law rule. But the cracks were minor." Fischel & Sykes, supra note 25, at 333. It is not clear how one
comes to the conclusion that the cracks were minor when there were two federal statutes specifically imposing
criminal liability on corporations and decisions by federal and state courts finding that corporations could be held
liable criminally for the acts of their agents. See Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal
Liability: Seeking a Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions,
63 TENN. L. REv. 793, 808-812 (1996) (reviewing the development of corporate criminal liability and the adoption
of corporate criminal liability in the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Interstate Commerce Act). One can hardly say
that the common law rule was pervasive when so many "cracks" had appeared, and New York Central laid to rest
the common law notion that a corporation could never be held liable. One basis for the criticism of New York
Central is the backwards economic logic of the Elkins Act, which Professors Fischel and Sykes rightly criticize.
They state, "[w]ithout the Elkins Act, the railroads would have had difficulty in enforcing their price-fixing cartel.
By upholding the statute, the Court gave the 'powerful' railroads a potent weapon to punish those who cheated on
the cartel." Id. at 335. That the underlying statute is economically indefensible is not a basis for finding that
Congress is without power to make corporations criminally liable for a violation of it.
29. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); see also Liparota v. United States,
471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) ("The definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature,
particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute."). Of course, the common law
remains important in interpreting the terms of federal criminal statutes. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575,
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can criticize the Congressional decision to impose criminal liability on corpora-
tions on the ground that it is ineffectual or unreflective, it is clearly within the
legislative branch's power to enact legislation authorizing the criminal prosecution
of an organization, unconstrained by any notion that the common law somehow
precluded the application of the criminal law to a corporation.
B. Why Use Criminal Law at all?
One criticism of the analysis in New York Central, and indeed the creation of
corporate criminal liability by Congress in the Elkins Act, was the Court's failure
to consider the efficacy of the criminal sanction as a means of regulating the
conduct of corporations. New York Central did not pause to consider how imposing
criminal liability fulfilled the usual goals of deterrence or retribution for punish-
ment. But then, that is not the Court's job, which is limited to deciding whether
Congress can enact a statute subjecting a corporation to criminal prosecution for a
violation of the Elkins Act. Once it answered the question "yes," that ended the
matter - the Court does not usually decide the wisdom of a legislative enactment.3°
In recent years, the notion of corporate criminal liability has been the subject of
strong criticism on the ground that the punishment to be imposed on an organiza-
tion, in the form of fines, does not justify the social costs of the proceeding. Under
the Elkins Act, for example, a shipper could be fined no less than $1,000 nor more
than $20,000 for a violation.31 Whether such a fine would engender compliance
with posted shipping rates under the Elkins Act - leaving aside whether enactment
of a price-fixing regime is a good idea - was never considered by the Court. New
York Central took it as a given that the criminal punishment authorized by
Congress was appropriate, which is what the courts do unless a defendant claims
that it violates the Eighth Amendment's proscription on cruel and unusual
punishments.
In any case, though, a corporation or any other type of business organization
cannot be sentenced to prison. A federal district judge claimed that courts have the
592 (1990) ("[A] statutory term is generally presumed to have its common-law meaning."). As the Court noted in
Taylor in considering whether burglary should be interpreted according to its common law meaning, "Whatever
else the Members of Congress might have been thinking of, they presumably had in mind at least the "classic"
common-law definition when they considered the inclusion of burglary as a predicate offense." Id. Relying on the
common law, however, is quite different from being required to follow its dictates, assuming they can be
discerned.
30. See Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266-67 (1952).
But it bears repeating - although it should not - that our finding that the law is not constitutionally
objectionable carries-no implication of approval of the wisdom of the legislation or of its efficacy.
These questions may raise doubts in our minds as well as in others. It is not for us, however, to
make the legislative judgment. We are not at liberty to erect those doubts into fundamental law.
Id.; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) ("Even if the wisdom of the policy be regarded as
debatable and its effects uncertain, still the legislature is entitled to its judgment.").
31. See Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 70-71 (1908) (quoting the Elkins Act).
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authority to sentence a company to a term of imprisonment, but only imposed
probation that required corporate officials to perform community service on the
entity's behalf and prohibited it from disposing of certain assets.32 The Fourth
Circuit, perhaps unfortunately, blocked the probationary sentence, calling it a
"nullity," thus reinforcing the view that the only viable punishment available to a
court in sentencing a corporation is a criminal fine.33
In looking at whether it makes sense from an economic point of view to impose
fines in a criminal proceeding to deter future misconduct by the organization, the
nearly unanimous judgment of scholars has been a resounding "no." For example,
Professor Khanna argues in favor of a civil liability regime because "pursuing
corporate criminal liability results in society bearing the higher sanctioning costs
of stigma penalties and the increased costs of deterring corporate misbehavior
created by the procedural protections of criminal law.",34 Professors Fischel and
Sykes assert that while "there are cases where government fines and penalties
make sense, the civil liability system is better suited to calculate appropriate fines
and penalties for organizational defendants" because criminal liability is usually
imposed in addition to civil liability, so that there is "overdeterrence ex ante, and
an excessive investment of resources in litigation ex post. '35 Professors Hamdani
and Klement argue that the threat of criminal liability that may cause the demise of
the firm could lessen deterrence, so that "civil penalties or the pervasiveness
32. United States v. Allegheny Bottling Co., 695 F.Supp. 856, 858-59 (E.D. Va. 1988), reversed in part by U.S.
v. Allegheny Bottling Co., 870 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1989). The district judge explained his analysis of a potential
corporate imprisonment:
Corporate imprisonment requires only that the Court restrain or immobilize the corporation. Such
restraint of individuals is accomplished by, for example, placing them in the custody of the United
States Marshal. Likewise, corporate imprisonment can be accomplished by simply placing the
corporation in the custody of the United States Marshal. The United States Marshal would restrain
the corporation by seizing th~e corporation's physical assets or part of the assets or restricting its
actions or liberty in a particular manner. When this sentence was contemplated, the United States
Marshal for the Eastern District of Virginia, Roger Ray, was contacted. When asked if he could
imprison Allegheny Pepsi, he stated that he could. He stated that he restrained corporations
regularly for bankruptcy court. He stated that he could close the physical plant itself and guard it.
He further stated that he could allow employees to come and go and limit certain actions or sales if
that is what the Court imposes.
Id. at 861. The court rejected the claim that a corporation could not be incarcerated, noting that
[c]onsiderable confusion regarding the ability of courts to order a corporation imprisoned has been
caused by courts mistakenly thinking that imprisonment necessarily involves incarceration in jail.
But since imprisonment of a corporation does not necessarily involve incarceration, there is no
reason to continue the assumption, which has lingered in the legal system unexamined and without
support, that a corporation cannot be imprisoned.
Id.
33. United States v. Harford, No. 88-5139, 1989 WL21563 (4th Cir. Jan. 11, 1989).
34. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1477, 1533
(1996).
35. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 25, at 321 (emphasis added).
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standard could discourage wrongdoing more effectively than the threat of going
out of business under the existing regime of entity liability.",36 Then-Professor
Posner even went so far as to argue that financial penalties for individual white
collar defendants would have a greater deterrent effect than prison, so that "fining
the affluent offender is preferable to imprisoning him from society's standpoint
because it is less costly and no less efficacious."
If the application of the criminal law to conduct were based solely - or perhaps
even predominantly - on whether it would deter future misconduct as a matter of
both specific and general deterrence, then the argument against corporate criminal
liability would be quite persuasive. The critique relies on the assumption that a
system of civil enforcement that would result in the assessment of a monetary
penalty could be created and would have roughly the same deterrent effect as a
criminal prosecution and its resultant fine. Leaving aside the issue of regulatory
capture37 in which regulated businesses take control of the agency charged with
overseeing them, simply relying on civil enforcement mechanisms entails viewing
the civil penalty as interchangeable with the criminal punishment, without regard
to the underlying nature of the legal violation. In other words, it's all just money to
a corporation-so who cares what label is attached to it when you pay the same
amount regardless of who collects it?
C. Moral Judgment
If the criminal law was just about punishment, then simple fines might be an
acceptable approach to organizational wrongdoing. But the criminal law is more
than simply the punishment that is authorized when a person or entity is found to
have engaged in proscribed conduct. The label "criminal" has social significance
aside from the particular punishment imposed on the offender. In the context of
corporate criminal liability, Professor Kahan put the issue quite well when he
wrote, "just as fines fail to express condemnation relative to imprisonment of
natural persons, so civil damages fail to express it relative to criminal liability for
corporations. Indeed, like fines, civil damages seem to connote that society is
36. Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. L. REv. 271,289 (2008).
37. Professors Shapiro and Steinzor explain:
Ralph Nader and other sixties activists shared with their Progressive Era and New Deal
predecessors the faith that effective government was necessary to regulate corporate behavior that
threatened people and the environment, but they were not prepared to trust the regulators. They
were particularly worried that regulated industries would blunt reforms by "capturing" the
bureaucracy. This concern was based in part on a series of reports published at the time by Nader
and teams of young investigators ("Nader's Raiders") documenting the overly cozy relationships
between regulators and the regulated as the primary reason for the faltering performance of older
regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission.
Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics, 86 Ttx. L. REv. 1741, 1745
(2008) (footnotes omitted).
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'pricing' corporate crime.""
Professor Hart explained that what distinguishes a crime from a civil tort is that
a crime entails "a pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community.v39
In applying the criminal law to certain conduct, there is more to it than just the
punishment of the criminal, which can only occur when the procedures required
for a conviction have been adhered to. There is a communal aspect to the
determination, that society expresses its view on the propriety of the defendant's
actions.
Professor Buell argued that "[c]riminal liability is distinguished by its communi-
cative force."?40 He argues for corporate criminal liability as meeting needs that
cannot be fulfilled only by prosecuting individual organizational actors because
"the serious attention that an entity criminal prosecution garners among institu-
tional managers, and their deep worry about reputation, evidence that the social
meaning of a legal judgment of institutional wrongdoing exceeds the social
meaning of just an institutional wrong."41 Focusing on the societal impact of
criminal prosecutions, Professor Kahan has described the expressive character of
the criminal law to mean that "[w]hen the law effectively expresses condemnation
of wrongdoers ... it reassures citizens that society does indeed stand behind the
values that the law embodies.""2
The criticism of corporate criminal fines does not necessarily mean that the
application of the criminal law is improper or, perhaps worse, so wasteful that it
should be jettisoned. That question whether there should be limits on how a
corporation should be sanctioned is distinct from the issue of whether a corpora-
tion should be subject to the criminal law. As an expression of the community's
moral judgment, there is a significant value to applying the criminal law to
organizations that act through their agents, apart from any instrumental benefits
from having a coercive means available to deter certain conduct.
II. REHABILITATING ORGANIZATIONS THROUGH THE CRIMINAL LAW
The rationale for criminal punishment as a vehicle for rehabilitating a defendant
fell out of favor many years ago. The notion that the criminal justice system should
operate as an instrument to "cure" an offender by reorienting his or her life to one
of acting as a law-abiding citizen had a visceral appeal for a society undergoing
significant change in the post-war era, particularly with the development of drugs
that could be used to treat psychological maladies. But the goal was hardly
attainable because there is not much evidence that most crimes are a result of a
'chemical or mental imbalance, and a system devoted to rehabilitating offenders
38. Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STuD. 609, 619 (1998).
39. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CoNrTEMP. PROBS. 401,405 (1958).
40. Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IN. L.J. 473, 501 (2006).
41. Id. at 498-499 (emphasis in original).
42. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Cm. L. Rv. 591,604 (1996).
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involves significant resources that the states were unwilling to commit.43 More-
over, it was often the case that defendants sentenced under a rehabilitative regime
received indeterminate prison terms until they could demonstrate their recovery, an
assessment often left to a small group of people who had the power to extend a
prison term if the person did not meet the criteria for reform. Indeterminate prison
terms for some, while others might have a sentence reduced because they knew
how to manipulate the system by feigning rehabilitation, led to its demise."
While rehabilitation lost virtually all of its luster by the 1970s, it has reappeared
more recently in the context of drug treatment courts, where those addicted to
narcotics can be sentenced to treatment programs rather than being placed in
penitentiaries. The idea of reforming the individual who is addicted to drugs is now
viewed as a more effective approach that can address the problem, while avoiding
further growth in the prison population that is draining resources from the states.45
A. The Problems of Rehabilitation do not Apply to Corporations
Like the addict, a corporation may be a good candidate for reform rather than
retributive punishment through high fines. When a corporation is prosecuted, the
issue of indeterminate sentences that plagued the rehabilitative model is not a
concern. Moreover, the problem with individuals feigning rehabilitation to obtain
release from prison is not as much of a consideration because the steps an
organization takes to implement reforms will be much more transparent and
verifiable.
A corporation can - and often does - terminate the employees involved in the
wrongdoing, so a retrospective punishment to exact retribution is hardly worth-
while. While an organization can be deterred from future violations, the economic
argument in favor of using administrative procedures to impose such penalties is
fairly persuasive, so that the goal of the criminal prosecution should not be focused
primarily on specific deterrence of the corporation to prevent it from violating the
law in the future. Instead, the use of the criminal law should be directed primarily
toward enabling the corporation to reform itself.
The issue of what is an appropriate punishment for a corporation ought to focus
43. See Richard S. Gebelein, Delaware Leads the Nation: Rehabilitation in a Law and Order Society; a System
Responds to Punitive Rhetoric, 7 DEL. L. REv. 1, 3 (2004) ("[The dramatically increasing numbers of prisoners
coming into correctional systems overwhelmed the financial ability and/or commitment of most jurisdictions to
provide quality rehabilitative programs to assist all prisoners."); Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation,
65 TuL. L. REv. 1011, 1018 (1991) ("Probably because of limited resources and doubt about the validity of
coerced therapy, we never fully implemented treatment programs in prison. Even in the era that demonstrated
great public interest and confidence in rehabilitation, actual resources remained minimal.") (footnote omitted).
44. For an overview of the criticisms of the rehabilitative approach to sentencing, see Richard C. Boldt,
Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1224-29 (1998).
• 45. See Arthur J. Lurigio, The First 20 Years of Drug Treatment Courts: A Brief Description of Their History
and Impact, 72 FED. PROBATION 13, 13 (2008) ("In their various forms, drug courts have been distinguished by
several features, such as expedited case processing, outpatient treatment, and support services (e.g., job placement
and housing).").
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on imposing a penalty that will allow the organization to redress its wrongdoing
while taking steps to ensure that the misconduct is less likely to recur. The
argument for calibrating criminal fines to ensure they are commensurate with the
harm caused while providing a reasonable incentive to minimize the likelihood of
recidivism becomes paramount, and it may be that a court should not impose any
criminal fine on the organization in much the same way that the addict is not
sentenced to prison. The goal instead should be on molding punishment to the
remediation of any harm and reforming the corporation, so that retribution would
play no role in determining the appropriate criminal sanction.
Unlike most street crimes, corporate wrongdoing usually involves economic
harm, and the effects of the violation should be redressed through some form of
remediation. The pure criminal fine-does not seem to be an efficient means to
remedy harm, which should be the first goal of the criminal prosecution of an
organization. Instead, restitution will be the key to correcting the harmful effects of
corporate crimes. The Supreme Court recognized the importance of restitution as a
means of rehabilitating an offender in Kelly i'. Robinson,46 when it stated:
Restitution is an effective rehabilitative penalty because it forces the defendant
to confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused. Such a penalty
will affect the defendant differently than a traditional fine, paid to the State as
an abstract and impersonal entity, and often calculated without regard to the
harm the defendant has caused. Similarly, the direct relation between the harm
and the punishment gives restitution a more precise deterrent effect than a
traditional fine.4 7
Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, restitution is mandatory for any
offense "in which an identifiable victim or victims has suffered a physical injury or
pecuniary loss. ' ' 48 The application of the criminal law to corporate wrongdoing
thus accomplishes one goal that a civil enforcement proceeding might not be able
to by ensuring that an order of restitution will be imposed on the organization.4
B. Violations in Spite of Compliance Programs
Once the harm caused by a violation is addressed by the corporation, then the
issue should be what steps should the organization take to reform itself to limit the
possibility that the wrongdoing will occur in the future. Virtually every publicly-
46. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
47. Id. at 49 n. 10 (1986) (citation omitted).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2006). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines similarly require a court to order restitution
when sentencing a corporation. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B 1.1(a) (2008).
49. See Joan H. Krause, Healthcare Fraud and Quality of Care: A Patient-CenteredApproach, 37 J. HFALTH L.
161, 178 (2004) ("Unfortunately, the majority of healthcare fraud cases involve civil and administrative causes of
action that do not independently provide for restitution."); Andrew Weissmann, A New Approach to Corporate
Criminal Liability, 44 AM. CRIm. L. REv. 1319, 1324 n.17 (2007) ("Restitution, of course, is a goal of sentencing
only if there is a criminal violation."). .
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traded corporation has in place some form of compliance program, and I have
argued elsewhere that "there is certainly plenty of law telling corporations how to
set up programs to ensure compliance with the vast array of legal and regulatory
rules under which all public companies must operate.,,5a The Sentencing Guide-
lines require the directors and senior management of a company seeking a reduced
sentence to "be knowledgeable about the content and operation of the compliance
and ethics program and shall exercise reasonable oversight with respect to the
implementation and effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program.,
51
Directors of Delaware public corporations are required to fulfill their so-called
Caremark duty, that:
[A] director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that
a corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is
adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in
theory at least, render a director liable for losses caused by non compliance
with applicable legal standards. 5
2
The problem is not a lack of compliance programs so much as when the
compliance program does not work because agents of the company engage in
wrongdoing despite the process in place to prevent such conduct. No compliance
program is perfect, and a corporation should not be prosecuted solely because an
employee found a way around internal controls, or the agents simply ignored
directives not to engage in certain types of conduct. The real issue is when there is
a breakdown in the company's compliance effort traceable to a corporate culture
that pressures employees to engage in risky conduct, despite the presence of
systems designed to prevent violations.
Companies that have in place compliance programs sometimes continue to
engage in wrongdoing, occasionally in the face of warnings to act otherwise. For
example, the directors of Chiquita Brands International, Inc., continued to allow
the company to make protection payments to a Columbian terrorist organization to
ensure the safety of its workers despite strong recommendations from corporate
counsel that the payments cease. The payments continued even after the company
revealed the potential violation to the Department of Justice, on the ground that
simply stopping the payments would endanger the workers. Chiquita entered a
guilty plea to making payments to a terrorist organization and paid a $25 million
fine.53
50. Peter J. Henning, Board Dysfunction: Dealing with the Threat of Corporate Criminal Liability, 77 U. CIN.
L. REv. 585,604 (2008).
51. U.S. SENTENCING GuDELIaNEs MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A) (2009).
52. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). The Delaware Supreme
Court affirmed the directors' obligation to institute effective monitoring systems in a company in Stone v. Ritter,
911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
53. See Henning, supra note 50, at 593-595 (explaining that Chiquita pled guilty to engaging in transactions
with a specially designated global terrorist, in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (2006)).
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The implementation of compliance procedures, even ones that meet the require-
ments for an "effective" program set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines, neither
guarantees a corporation's employees will not violate the law in the future, nor
does it mean that the company should not be held accountable in a criminal
prosecution for the acts of its employees. If significant or systematic violations
occur despite the presence of a compliance program, then a criminal prosecution
can be an effective means to impel a corporation to institute the type of structural
reform necessary to minimize the likelihood of similar violations in the future.
C. Rehabilitating Corporate Criminals through DPAs and NPAs.
Corporate management and employees may be resistant to the type and degree
of change that entails a significant restructuring of the corporate culture. While
civil penalties offer a measure of deterrence to future misconduct, there is a risk
that civil enforcement will be viewed as only a price to be paid. I have argued that
the threat of criminal prosecution can be a significant motivating factor to impel a
board of directors to act independently of management in order to "consider the
need to change the organization both to address the problems that occurred in the
past and to ensure that future violations of that type do not happen again."54 When
criminal prosecution and a resultant punishment is viewed as advancing the
rehabilitation of the corporation, then the notion of reform rather than retrospective
sanctions becomes the means to assess whether the criminal law should be used
against the organization.
Using the criminal law to further the goal of rehabilitation affects whether a
criminal prosecution should even be instituted, and if it is then what type of
sanction should be imposed. Prosecutors have enormous discretion in deciding
whether or not to file criminal charges if there is sufficient evidence for a
reasonable juror to find the defendant guilty.55 The Department of Justice has set
forth its views on the appropriate circumstances under which it will charge a
corporation with a crime in the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations. The Department identifies the following as a "General Consider-
ation" in deciding whether to charge a corporation: "Indicting corporations for
wrongdoing enables the government to be a force for positive change of corporate
culture, and a force to prevent, discover, and punish serious crimes."5 6 While there
are a number of case-specific issues related to charging an organization with a
crime, such as the nature of its cooperation and involvement of senior manage-
ment, the first consideration should be the efficacy of the criminal law rather than
the civil enforcement mechanism as a means to foster real change.
54. Henning, supra note 50, at 610 (emphasis added).
55. See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REv. 853,913 (2007) ("Federal criminal
law delegates to [prosecutors] vast discretion while, at the same time, considerations of separation of powers
constrain courts.").
56. U.S. DEP'T OF JusrcE,U.S. ATToRNEY's MANUAL § 9-28.200 (2008) (emphasis added).
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Professor Garrett identifies the current approach to corporate criminal liability
as "structural reform prosecution" through which the Department of Justice has
"adopted a novel strategy by prosecuting large organizations far more often, but
leveraging the prosecutions to secure adoption of sweeping internal reforms.
5 7
Since the demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002, the number of DPAs and NPAs has
increased substantially, and the government's approach to these cases has devel-
oped some fairly clear lines. Messers, Spivack, and Raman call federal prosecutors
"The New Regulators," so that "[b]y focusing more on prospective questions of
corporate governance and compliance, and less on the retrospective question of the
entity's criminal liability, federal prosecutors have fashioned a new role for
themselves in policing, and supervising, corporate America.,
58
The use of DPAs and NPAs has not been without its flaws, of course, with the
Department of Justice encountering its fair share of stumbles in crafting and
implementing these agreements. There were certainly abuses, such as the decision
to allow Bristol-Myers Squibb to endow a chair at the law school alma mater of the
United States Attorney who negotiated the agreement.59 More ominously, the DPA
with accounting firm KPMG was severely criticized for allowing the government
to force employees to cooperate in its investigation on pain of losing their job and
payment of attorney's fees by the firm. In United States v. Stein,60 the Second
Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of the indictment of thirteen former
partners and employees for the government's violation of their Sixth Amendment
right to counsel by pressuring KPMG to cut off payment of attorney's fees as a
means of garnering the DPA, contrary to the firm's prior policy.
61
The Department of Justice learned some lessons from earlier controversies, and
has started to take a more uniform approach to the agreements. In March 2008, the
Department issued a memorandum, "Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred
57. Garrett, supra note 55, at 856.
58. Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the 'New Regulators': Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution
Agreements, 45 AM. CRnI. L. REv. 159, 161 (2008).
59. See Christopher J. Christie & Robert M. Hanna, A Push Down the Road of Good Corporate Citizenship:
The Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey and Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., 43 AM. Caim. L. REV. 1043, 1055-56 (2006). Mr. Christie was the United States Attorney for the
District of New Jersey who negotiated the DPA, and he defended the provision on the ground that "[t]he idea for
endowing the chair originated with counsel for Bristol-Myers." Id. at 1058 n.29. The source of the provision is
largely irrelevant when the appearance of currying favor calls into question the fairness of the resolution of the
investigation.
60. 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008)
61. Id. at 153. The court stated:
Although defendants' Sixth Amendment rights attached only -upon indictment, the district court
properly considered pre-indictment state action that affected defendants post-indictment. When
the government acts prior to indictment so as to impair the suspect's relationship with counsel
post-indictment, the pre-indictment actions ripen into cognizable Sixth Amendment deprivations
upon indictment.
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Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations,"
that provides for oversight of the selection of monitors who will oversee a
corporation's compliance with the terms of a DPA or NPA, a common feature of
these agreements. Among other things, the Deputy Attorney General must approve
the monitor selected, and prosecutors "should decline to accept a monitor if he or
she has an interest in, or relationship with, the corporation or its employees,
officers or directors that would cause a reasonable person to question the monitor's
impartiality., 62 Yet, the availability of a DPA or NPA, and when one type of
agreement is more appropriate than the other, remains largely unknown because
there are no clear guidelines regarding when a pre-charge disposition of a case is
appropriate or how it should be structured.63 For example, Boeing entered into an
NPA related to procurement fraud and the unlawful attempt to hire a senior
Department of Defense official:
[I]n part because the company is fully cooperating with the government's
investigation. Boeing has agreed to accept responsibility for the conduct of its
employees in these matters, continue its cooperation with federal investigators,
pay a monetary penalty of $50 million, and maintain an effective ethics and
compliance program, with particular attention to the hiring of former govern-
ment officials and the handling of competitor information.64
Norwegian oil company Statoil, ASA entered into a DPA for payments to Iranian
officials to secure oil and gas rights in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, and Assistant Attorney General Alice Fisher praised the company's coopera-
62. Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads of
Dep't Components, U.S. Attorneys, section I[ (Mar. 7, 2008), available at http:l/www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foia_reading.room /usam/title9/crmOO163.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
63. As Professor Garrett explained: *
Taking as a given that organizational prosecutions will continue for some time and that some kind
of settlement option will remain preferable for both prosecutors and for organizations, defining the
scope of those settlements and their terms is an important and under-examined project. The DOJ
has not yet made policy statements. regarding most structural reform aspects of the agreements.
Brandon L. Garrett, United States v. Goliath, 93 VA. L. REv. IN BRIEF 105, 113 (2007). In response, Mr. Warin and
Mr. Boutros explain:
Guidance on the availability and appropriateness of pretrial diversion agreements is needed now,
and such guidance must come from DOJ, not from the courts. Regrettably, DOJ has been
unhelpfully silent on this issue. Current DOJ guidance focuses only on the threshold discretionary
question of whether a business organization should be indicted at all. There has been absolutely no
guidance, however, on the second discretionary question of whether a case should be resolved
through the vehicle of a guilty plea, a DPA, or an NPA. There also exists a lacuna of guidance about
appropriate terms to be included in DPAs.
F. Joseph Warin & Andrew S. Boutros, Response, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: A 1ew from the Trenches
anda Proposal for Reform, 93 VA. L. REv. IN BRiEF 121, 126 (2007) (footnote omitted).
64. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Boeing to Pay United States Record $615 Million to Resolve Fraud
Allegations (June 30, 2006), available at http:llwww.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/June/06-civ_412.html (last visited
Oct. 7, 2009).
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tion:
The Department's willingness to resolve this particular investigation by a
deferred prosecution agreement is in large part due to the exceptional assis-
tance Statoil provided to U.S. authorities in connection with the investigation,
the significant remedial efforts undertaken by the company, and the fact that
the Norwegian authorities also investigated and sanctioned Statoil.65
It is difficult to comprehend why Boeing received an NPA requiring it to pay $615
million to settle multiple investigations involving different U.S. Attorneys offices
with no criminal charges ever filed, while Statoil paid $10 million for a single
violation under its DPA that entailed the filing of criminal charges which were then
held in abeyance.66 One company was "fully cooperating" while the other
provided "exceptional assistance," so there was no perceptible distinction between
them on the issue of cooperation.
Despite the flaws in the Department of Justice's approach, its focus on using
criminal sanctions to reform corporations is an important development in orienting
corporate criminal liability toward rehabilitating organizations whose agents
violate the law. Not every case calls for a criminal prosecution even if one could be
brought successfully under the respondeat superior theory of corporate liability.
Avoiding the "Arthur Andersen effect" of a criminal prosecution that will result in
significant collateral consequences is an important reason to look to prosecutions
that allow a corporation to continue in existence so long as it takes step to redress
any harm caused and measure to prevent recurrence of the problem.
Reforms can only go so far, of course, and it may be that the organization's
agents will engage in similar conduct again in the future because the corporate
culture simply cannot respond to efforts to change it. The availability of the
criminal sanction as retribution against a recidivist corporation may reach a point
where the government needs to seek a significant penalty against a corporation,
including perhaps its demise.
CONCLUSION
The topic of corporate criminal liability has been the subject of significant
65. Press release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Resolves Probe Against Oil Company That Bribed Iranian
Official (October 13, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nyspressreleases/October06/statoildeferred
prosecutionagreementpr.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
66. One criticism leveled against DPAs and NPAs that require a company to implement new compliance and
monitoring programs is that these programs impose an undue burden on a company to expend its resources. See
Spivack & Raman, supra note 58, at 185 ("[T]he considerable costs that monitoring imposes on a company cannot
and should not be ignored. One can legitimately query whether monitor-imposed corporate governance reforms
actually enhance shareholder value or promote the general welfare."). If the government requires the payment of a
significant fine in addition to the new programs and any restitution, then that criticism makes some sense. But it
does not seem appropriate absent a heavy fine that will be paid to the government. Using corporate resources to
enhance its future compliance seems like a much more worthwhile use of the organization's money than simply
turning it over to the United States Treasury.
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academic comment, particularly over the past few years since the demise of Arthur
Andersen, and especially in light of the Supreme Court overturning the conviction
that did nothing to revive the firm. The investigation and settlement of cases
involving business organizations draws significant - and perhaps even inordinate -
attention because, unlike an ordinary street crime, the potential impact of the
misconduct and economic value of the transactions is so much larger than a petty
theft or drug deal. Yet, the number of corporations sentenced under the Sentencing
Guidelines in fiscal year 2008 was 199, while there were over 25,000 drug cases
and over 70,000 immigration cases during the same period. Interestingly, not one
of the organizations that was sentenced was found to have an effective compliance
program. This indicates that most of these companies are smaller, closely-held
businesses that do not have any monitoring systems in place rather than public
corporations that can be expected to adhere to the precepts of state corporate law
mandating an effective compliance system as a shield against liability to sharehold-
ers.
Calls for changing the respondeat superior theory of assessing corporate
criminal liability have fallen on deaf ears so far. The recent Second Circuit
decision in United States v. Ionia Management, S.A. 67 brushed off the assertion
that the government should be required to prove that a corporation lacked an
effective compliance program as an element of the offense, stating that the
argument was "unavailing" and that "[a]dding such an element is contrary to the
precedent of our Circuit on this issue."' 68 Altering the method of proving a
corporation's liability would require Congressional action, which would be a
difficult sell politically, but it is certainly not impossible.
The criminal law is retrospective in nature, asking whether proof of the
defendant's act and mental state at the time of the offense are sufficient to establish
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For corporations, however, simply assessing past
conduct is not as important as determining whether the organization is in need of
reform to ensure future compliance. If rehabilitation is the goal, which should be
the primary focus, then the decision whether to prosecute and how to punish
becomes a forward-looking enterprise that does not simply assess the nature of the
organization at the time of the agent's conduct.
Any proposal for changing the scope or application of corporate criminal
liability should be assessed in light of the rehabilitative goal for applying the
criminal law to organizations. Focusing on the presence or absence of an effective
compliance system at the time of the offense says little about whether the company
is in need of significant reform today, and may even be a distraction to assessing
the need for rehabilitative measures. Even if a corporation's compliance system
was deemed effective, the violation occurred nonetheless and the more important
67. 555 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2009).
68. Id. 310 (2d Cir. 2009).
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issue is whether the organization needs to change its operations to prevent future
wrongdoing. If the answer to that question is "no," then the use of the criminal law
would be ineffective, not because the compliance program was deemed sufficient
but because there is no need to reform the organization. On the other hand,
focusing on what might ostensibly appear to be an effective compliance program
that did not prevent significant misconduct within the organization is irrelevant to
determining how the organization must be changed going forward.
